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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the
Right to Education in American Jurisprudence:
Barriers and Approaches to Implementation
Emily H. Wood'
I. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(hereinafter the Covenant on ESC Rights or the Covenant) states:
The ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as
well as his civil and political rights .....
The economic, social, and cultural rights (hereinafter ESC rights) listed
in the Covenant include a variety of rights, such as: (1) the right to earn a
living by work which is freely chosen or accepted; (2) the right to an
adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, and housing; (3) the
right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health; and (4)
the right to an education.2
As of October 11, 2007, 157 countries had ratified the Covenant on
ESC Rights, including Canada, Japan, West Germany, and the United
Kingdom. In fact, "[t]he United States is the only major industrialized
democracy that has not yet ratified the Covenant.",4 Although President
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
A.B., June 2003, Politics, Certificate in the Program of Women and Gender, Princeton
University. The author would like to thank the members of the Hastings Women's Law
Journal for their help and dedication in preparing this Note for publication, and Christina
Alvarez for her support and patience during the Note-writing process.
1. Asbjom Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal
Challenge, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, 3, 5 (Asbjom
Eide, Catarina Krause & Allas Rosas, eds., 2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK].
2. Id. at 7-10.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, Dec.
16, 1966, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm (last updated Oct. 11,2007).
4. Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human
Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy, " 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 79 n.3, 80 (1992).
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Carter signed the Covenant on ESC Rights and sent it to Congress for
ratification as part of a package of international human rights treaties, it has
yet to be ratified and has been pending before Congress since 1978. 5
A number of theories attempt to explain the United States' reluctance
to ratify the Covenant on ESC Rights. One such theory suggests that ESC
rights lacked domestic support because they were viewed as foreign to the
American legal system.6 The fact that "the U.S. Government, [since the
early 1980s], has categorically denied that there is any such thing as an
economic, a social or a cultural human right' 7 highlights such an argument.
Furthermore, the rights articulated in the Covenant have been viewed by
the State Department as a "socialist manifesto thinly veiled in the language
of rights."8 Another theory asserts that the United States' reluctance to
ratify the covenant is based on a constitutional federalism conflict. This
position argues that the issues set forth in the Covenant on ESC Rights
should be addressed solely by states, and ratification by the U.S. Senate
would impinge on state sovereignty. 9 Although there had been a push in
the 1990s to advance an international human rights agenda, 10 the signing of
the Covenant on ESC Rights has yet to be realized.
Both of these theories emphasize the differences underlying the
Covenant on ESC Rights and the U.S. Constitution. ESC rights, for
example, are considered "second generation rights" and emerged from the
"socialist philosophy which holds that human rights can only be guaranteed
by positive state action."' 1 "The drafters of the Covenant on ESC Rights
believed that political and civil rights could not be effectively exercised
unless the basic needs of survival were met." 12  Conversely, the U.S.
Constitution focuses on:
[P]lacing negative constraints on the power of government...
[and] what the government cannot do .... What the Constitution
fails to do is recognize that government has certain positive
obligations to its citizenry with respect to the social and economic
sphere of life.'
3
5. Stark, supra note 4, at 79 n.3, 80. See also Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 365 (1990).
6. Stark, supra note 4, at 81; see also Alston, supra note 5, at 366.
7. Alston, supra note 5, at 367.
8. Stark, supra note 4, at 81.
9. Id. at 82.
10. Id. at 86-87. For example, in the 1990s the Civil Covenant was ratified by the
U.S. Senate, the U.S. participated in the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension,
and the U.S. signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Id.
11. Manfred Nowak, The Right to Education, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra note 1, at 245, 253.
12. Stark, supra note 4, at 81 n.9.
13. Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International
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In the United States, ESC rights are considered distinct from those
rights that we regard as "political and civil rights."'14 This fundamental
distinction creates an underlying conflict in attempting to argue for legal
recognition of ESC rights in a judicial system derived from a form of
government established through negative constraints. Consequently, U.S.
legal history and the capitalist and libertarian foundations of government
tend to fight against the concept of an activist, socially focused
government. 
5
This Note will seek to explore whether these rationales against
ratification of ESC rights are actually valid, or whether the U.S. judiciary
has created a space within which ESC rights could be implemented.
Section II of this Note will identify the types of rights currently recognized
in the United States and explore how rights are recognized through the
example of education. Subsequently, Section III will discuss and analyze
possible proposals in support of U.S. recognition of ESC rights. These
proposals include: (1) upholding citations to international law supporting
the Covenant; (2) finding ESC rights to be an essential component of
political and civil rights, which are explicitly protected under U.S. law; and
(3) considering certain ESC rights as fundamental rights under equal
protection jurisprudence.
The language of ESC rights divides the obligations under the UN
Convention into four main categories: (1) respecting ESC rights; (2)
protecting ESC rights; (3) promoting ESC rights; and (4) fulfilling ESC
rights. 16 Due to the structure and emphasis of the U.S. government, as is
discussed later in this Note, the goals of promoting and fulfilling ESC
rights are beyond the objectives that are likely to be achieved at any point
in the near future. However, this Note argues that the federal judiciary has
currently accepted the first of these categories - respecting ESC rights -
and the current challenge is to move into the second category regarding the
protection of ESC rights.
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1203
(1987).
14. In fact, the United States government and judiciary have even been reluctant to
label these as rights, as indicated in the case law addressed in this section. See discussion
infra Parts II. B., III.
15. Park, supra note 13, at 1205.
16. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE v, XX-
xxii (Scott Leckie & Anne Gallagher eds., U. of Pa. Press 2006) [hereinafter LEGAL
RESOURCE GUIDE].
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II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Although rhetoric surrounding human rights in the United States
traditionally emphasized the U.S. structure of government as recognizing
only civil and political rights, this assertion is not entirely accurate. Rather,
a more detailed inspection of U.S. history reveals a movement toward
recognizing more social and economic rights. One such example is
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech on "freedom from want," in
which he recommended a new Bill of Rights that would include: (1) the
right to earn enough to provide adequate food, clothing, and recreation; (2)
the right of every family to a decent home; (3) the right to adequate
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; (4) the
right to adequate protection from the economic consequences of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment; and (5) the right to a good
education. 17 In addition, the New Deal began a period during which the
federal government undertook social welfare as a matter of law, and
established programs such as Social Security. 18 The United States also
participated in the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension in
1990 and signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, "expressly
affirming in an international instrument that 'everyone... has the right...
to enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights.""
19
While the federal judiciary has been more reluctant to recognize the
importance of a number of ESC rights, it has created an equal protection
framework that could easily be used to integrate protection of ESC rights
into U.S. jurisprudence. Legally recognized rights in the United States are
usually protected through a class-based assessment, in which they
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny available.20 This class-based
assessment would interact with a claim for ESC rights, for example, on the
basis that the failure to legally recognize certain ESC rights
disproportionately impacts a specific group. Traditionally, when dealing
with social issues and equal protection, courts have used a deferential
rational basis test for state regulations. 21  But this approach has also
17. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6,
1941), reprinted in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at
2855-61 (Fred L. Israel ed., N.Y. Chelsea House Publishers 1966).
18. Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Social Security Privitization, 41 B.C. L. REv. 975, 1025-26 (2000).
19. Stark, supra note 4, at 87.
20. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982).
21. Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1863, 1870 (2003); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
483-84 (1970); see also Park, supra note 13, at 1211-12.
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allowed states to utilize any possible rationale for depriving people of ESC
rights without a meaningful challenge from the U.S. Supreme Court.
While the primary focus of this Note is the U.S. legal system, the
experiences of other countries are informative in presenting possible
solutions to the challenge of recognizing and implementing ESC rights.
For example, in South Africa, a "comprehensive set of social, economic
and cultural rights" has been integrated into their Bill of Rights.22 The
South African Bill of Rights has been held to impose a combination of
positive and negative obligations on the state, and these rights are
enforceable by the courts.23 In enforcing such rights, the South African
judicial system developed a model of "reasonableness review," which asks
"whether the means chosen are reasonably capable of facilitating the
realization of the socio-economic rights in question., 24  Such language
closely resembles the rational basis review that the U.S. judiciary
undertakes for equal protection analysis. This similarity suggests that the
South African model could be used to integrate ESC rights into the United
States' current legal framework, and could support analyzing ESC rights in
a class-based assessment style.
However, a class-based approach may be more effective for those
categories analyzed with heightened scrutiny, such as race, national origin,
and gender. Although ESC rights are often aimed at addressing economic
status disparities, there is an arguable correlation between income level,
25race, and access to resources including housing, food, and health care. In
one study, Joe Soss, Sanford Schram, Thomas Vartanian, and Erin O'Brien
found that:
[S]tates with relatively high minority (African-American or Latino)
welfare populations are more likely to create institutional obstacles -
such as strict time limits for eligibility to receive welfare assistance
and caps on benefits to children conceived by recipients -
blocking the receipt of welfare assistance.26
Furthermore, a study by Lee Harris found a negative relationship
"between the proportion of African-American welfare families and the
amount of cash assistance. 27 Another example of the relationship between
22. Sandra Liebenberg, Enforcing Positive Socio-Economic Rights Claims: The
South African Model of Reasonableness Review, THE ROAD To A REMEDY: CURRENT ISSUES
IN THE LITIGATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 73, 73 (John Squires,
Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele eds., 2005).
23. Id. at 73.
24. Id. at 78-79.
25. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
26. Lee A. Harris, From Vermont to Mississippi: Race and Cash Welfare, 38 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 1, 13 (2006) (citing Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief"
Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 378, 379
(2001)).
27. Id. at 19.
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race, poverty, and access to resources is illustrated by studies showing that
"private hospitals [are] leaving minority communities, and those with the
least resources, in order to relocate to more affluent, predominantly white
communities., 28 By arguing under a heightened scrutiny analysis that lack
of access to items such as monetary support, food (i.e., food stamps), and
health care violate the equal protection doctrine, the existing U.S. civil
rights framework and Title VII may help the United States take that first
step towards judicial recognition of ESC rights.
In addition to these studies, academic analyses on possible methods to
advance the recognition of ESC rights have focused on two alternative
arguments: (1) establishing strict scrutiny for laws which deny the basic
needs of individuals; or (2) establishing an intermediate standard of
review. 29  Despite the possible argument that strict scrutiny should be
imposed due to the disparate impact on minority groups' access to
resources, such recognition would be a fairly dramatic reversal of the
Supreme Court's current approach.30  While the second approach -
establishing an intermediate standard of review - is more flexible, the
Supreme Court has limited intermediate scrutiny to cases involving gender
and children born out of wedlock. The Supreme Court emphasized that
"[i]ntermediate review is triggered when classification involves 'either a
significant interference with liberty or a denial of a benefit vital to the
individual.' ' 31 While access to food and healthcare could be seen as "vital
to the individual," the Court has not indicated a willingness to expand the
categories included in intermediate scrutiny.
Past rhetoric and the current legal framework indicate the potential
success and importance of integrating ESC rights. However, the federal
judicial system has been reluctant to take such a step. As a result, no ESC
rights are officially recognized - at least not under the heading of "ESC
rights."
B. RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
A CASE STUDY
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
education in order to prepare citizens to participate in self-government and
function as well-adjusted members of society,32 the Court in San Antonio
28. Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight from Minority Communities: How Our Existing
Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 1023, 1029 (2005).
29. Park, supra note 13, at 1246.
30. Neuman, supra note 21, at 1870; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-84
(1970); see also Park, supra note 13, at 1211-12.
31. Park, supra note 13, at 1247.
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also, Elizabeth Reilly,
Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next Century, 34 AKRON L.
REv. 1, 1-2 (2000).
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Independent School District v. Rodriguez held that education is not a
fundamental right in the United States.33 In doing so, the Court noted that
it "has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental
interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet [the
Supreme Court has] never presumed to possess either the ability or the
authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the more
informed electoral choice." 34 Rodriguez sets forth the traditional approach
to the right to education, which was subsequently followed in Martinez v.
Bynum.35  In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that a residency
requirement for attending free public schools does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.36 Because Morales moved to Texas for the sole
purpose of attending school, the Court held that he could be excluded from
public education because he lacked the requisite intent to remain in the
state.37
Rodriguez was decided in 1973 during a time in which there could have
been alternative incentives for the Supreme Court to reach the decision that
it ultimately made. During this time period, states (and as a result courts)
were struggling with actually implementing remedial schemes consistent
with Brown v. Board of Education.38 Because the desegregation process
frequently involved bussing, democratic promotion of such methods left
congressional representatives alienated from a section of their constituents -
the white working class - and resulted in a swing in political power.39
The newfound Republican power attempted to control some of the massive
remedies being undertaken, and:
[A]s part of their agenda to stop the liberals from interpreting the
Constitution to protect the poor, the conservatives decided, in San
Antonio [Independent School District] v. Rodriguez, that the states
could continue to have school districts that spent significantly
different amounts depending upon their tax base.40
The political pressure to limit the Brown remedies arguably had an
influence on the Rodriguez majority, affecting its decision to significantly
limit the framing of the issues involved in the case. In that case, the
Supreme Court asked whether there was a "guarantee to the citizenry the
33. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
34. Id. at 36.
35. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 340-41 n.7 (1983).
36. Id. at 328.
37. Id. at 330-31.
38. See generally Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1963); U.S. v. Hall, 472
F.2d 261 (1972); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491
U.S. 274 (1989).
39. James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education is Not Enough,
34 AKRON L. REv. 383, 389 (2000).
40. Id.
most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice., 41 However,
the actual issue facing the Court was whether the level of education
provided met the minimum necessary to sufficiently engage in those
political activities that are explicitly protected under the Constitution.42
Apart from arguing that there was no guarantee of the most effective
speech, the majority opinion also claimed that education was an area
primarily left to the states.43 While this is true to a degree, the federal
government has a duty to ensure state compliance with the principles of the
Constitution and has exercised this obligation through a range of other
statutory provisions such as mandatory school attendance and the legal
regulation of school curricula, both of which are part of our current
education system.44 Consequently, the rationale relied upon in support of
the Rodriguez holding is unfounded.
The right to education has been recognized in a number of international
covenants. Apart from the Covenant on ESC Rights, the right to education
is also emphasized in Article XII of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man of 1948, which proclaimed that, "the right to education
'should be based on the principles of liberty, morality and human
solidarity' and should prepare every person 'to attain a decent life, to raise
his standard of living, and to be a useful member of society."
45
Unlike the international community, the United States has refrained
from signing a number of international treaties on the issue of education.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the United States is one of the
few countries that has not ratified the Covenant on ESC Rights.46 In
addition, as of January 2008, the United States had yet to ratify the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC), which also
addresses the right to education. 47 The CRC has been ratified by 191 states -
all independent states of the world except for Somalia and the United
States.48 However, failure to formally adopt international treaties on the
issue of education has not prohibited the United States from emphasizing
the importance of education, as illustrated above.
The right to education is unique among the ESC rights because it is one
of the only rights that contains aspects of three generations: "the first
generation of civil and political rights; the second generation of economic,
social and cultural rights, and the third generation of solidarity or group
41. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
42. This issue will be further explored in Section III. B. of this Note.
43. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37-38.
44. Nowak, supra note 11, at 248.
45. Id. at 249-50.
46. Stark, supra note 4, at 80.
47. Nowak, supra note 11, at 251 n. 17.
48. Id.; see also Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principle International Human Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf
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rights. 49 Consequently, recognition of the right to education could be an
important tool to bridge the gap between first- and second-generation rights
and build support within U.S. jurisprudence for other ESC rights, such as
the right to employment or the right to food.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF ESC RIGHTS
How can ESC rights become a part of American jurisprudence despite
the failure of the Senate to ratify the Covenant on ESC Rights? As Section
II set forth, despite past support from the executive branch and the potential
to apply the equal protection framework to ESC rights, the U. S. Supreme
Court has been reluctant to protect these rights and has even rejected
outright education as a fundamental right. This Section focuses on
addressing the bases that can be used to transition legal conduct toward
ESC rights from respect to protection.
A. RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN FEDERAL COURTS
Legal protection of ESC rights could be successfully advanced through
a constitutional comparative approach in which international legal
precedents are accepted as valid precedents in addressing domestic legal
issues. If an international human right is considered to be customary
international law by U.S. courts, then it is also a part of U.S. law and must
be administered by courts in this country as part of federal statutory law.5°
International precedents, constituting customary international law, have
been accepted and recognized in the United States by federal courts. 51 One
such example is Boehm v. Superior Court.52  In Boehm, the California
Court of Appeals cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
deciding what constitutes the minimum scope of basic needs. 53 Similarly,
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,5 4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that
"official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is
clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of
aliens and citizens. 55 However, the federal judiciary views certain rights
49. Nowak, supra note 11, at 252. However, the right to education has consistently
been accepted as primarily a "second generation right." Id.
50. Id. at 252. There are also circumstances where U.S. courts look and refer to
international authority even when the proposition may not rise to the level of customary
international law. These types of cases will be discussed in further detail below. See infra
notes 51-80 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Park, supra note 13, at 1242-43.
52. Boehm v. Super. Ct., 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1986). Boehm was later overruled
by a legislative enactment which required counties to "adopt standards of aid and care for
the indigent and dependent poor," rather than have the standard of aid to be based upon a
specific factual study of actual subsistence costs of living in each county. Taylor v. Contra
Costa County, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 448, 449 (1996).
53. Boehm, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
54. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
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as hierarchically more acceptable than other rights. For example, "freedom
from torture and arbitrary imprisonment are more readily accepted as
fundamental human rights [by the judiciary] than are the rights to
subsistence benefits, shelter, healthcare or education.' 56 In In re Alien
Children Education Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas supported the devaluation of certain ESC rights by stating
that "the right to education, while it represents an important international
goal, has not acquired the status of customary international law.,
57
Contrary to the conclusion of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, ESC rights have arguably been widely accepted and
recognized, and should be considered sufficiently established in the
international community to have achieved a status as customary
international law. As mentioned earlier, 157 countries have adopted the
Covenant on ESC Rights and some of these rights have been recognized in
U.S. courts, though not under the title of ESC rights. For example, the
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of education to prepare
citizens to participate in self-government and function as well-adjusted
58Thrihmembers of society. The right to education is also emphasized in Article
XII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948
which stated that, "the right to education 'should be based on the principles
of liberty, morality and human solidarity' and should prepare every person
'to attain a decent life, to raise his standard of living, and to be a useful
member of society."' 59  The CRC, which has been ratified by 191
countries, also addresses the right to education.6 ° In addition, a number of
other covenants and treaties have supported and recognized ESC rights.6'
56. Park, supra note 13, at 1242.
57. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
58. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954); see also, Reilly, supra note 32, at 1-2.
59. Nowak, supra note 11, at 249-50.
60. Id. at251 n.17.
61. While not an exhaustive list, some of these documents include treaties, such as
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education; declarations, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger
and Malnutrition; various UN standards, such as the Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No. 4 (1991) on the Right to Adequate
Housing, CESCR General Comment No. 6 (1995) on the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of Older Persons, CESCR General Comment No. 8 (1997) on the Relationship
Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
CESCR General Comment No. 10 (1998) on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions
in the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment No.
12 (1999) on the Right to Adequate Food, CESCR General Comment No. 13 (1999) on the
Right to Education, and CESCR General Comment No. 14 (2000) on the Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health; interpretive texts, such as the Limburg Principles on
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
Bangalore Declaration and Plan of Action Regarding Economic, Cultural and Social Rights
and the Role of Lawyers; and regional instruments, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Protocol One, and the Additional Protocol to
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Even if certain rights do not rise to the level of customary international
law, parties can still assert that international precedents and human rights
law can be validly cited to in American jurisprudence. There are currently
two lead cases, Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v. Texas, which support
the use of international precedents to inform constitutional interpretations
of domestic legal issues.
In Roper v. Simmons, a case also examining the proper role of
international authorities, the U S. Supreme Court held that the U.S.
Constitution prohibited imposition of the death penalty for offenders under
the age of eighteen.62 The Court acknowledged that it "has referred to the
laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual
punishments."' 63 Furthermore, Roper noted how Article 37 of the CRC
"contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes
committed by juveniles under 18." Similar language can be found in other
significant international covenants, such as the American Convention on
Human Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child.64  Roper is of special significance because of the close parallel
between the international precedents cited and those applicable to ESC
rights. Most notably, neither the CRC nor the Covenant on ESC Rights has
been ratified by the United States. However, this lack of ratification did
not dissuade the U.S. Supreme Court from citing the CRC as precedent for
the legal interpretation of the rights protected by the Eighth Amendment.
Reliance on international standards also emerged in the recent case of
Lawrence v. Texas, which held that states could not criminalize consensual
same-sex sodomy.65 In reaching this conclusion, the majority discussed a
wide range of international support for the proposition that consensual
sodomy should not be criminalized, including the opinions and laws of
other nations and interpretations of international conventions. For
example, in the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy noted how the British
Parliament recommended and enacted laws against the punishment of
homosexual conduct.66 In addition, the Lawrence majority emphasized that
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. See generally LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 16.
62. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
63. Id. at 575 (referencing Atkins v. Virginia, 356 U.S. 304, 317, n.21 (2002));
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (recognizing the relevance of the
views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is "cruel and
unusual"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
64. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (referencing the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1468-70). The Court
also noted that "the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty." Id.
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
66. Id. at 572-73 (referencing COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION, WOLFENDEN REPORT (Stein & Day 1963) (1957)).
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the European Court of Human Rights considered a similar case and found
that "laws proscribing [homosexual] conduct were invalid under the
European Convention on Human Rights. 67  Through an exploration of
international norms and values, Justice Kennedy created a basis to reverse
the Bowers v. Hardwick precedent 68 and establish a broader interpretation
of the rights protected under the U.S. Constitution.
69
These cases illustrate how constitutional comparativism has been
utilized to expand individual liberties. 70 However, strong opposition exists
as to the validity of citations to international law in deciding constitutional
issues. As articulated by Justice Scalia in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent,
"[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence... as the Court
seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize conduct., 71 Justice
Scalia goes on to state that any such discussion of foreign views is merely
dicta; "[d]angerous dicta, however, since this Court.. . should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans., 72 Similarly, opponents of
applying international law to domestic constitutional issues question the
relevance of a "'modern international treaty ... for judges trying to
interpret the text of our Constitution which was adopted over 200 years
ago?' The criticism reflects a ... strong impression that international law
is arrogantly overreaching, transgressing its proper role as a bracketed
discipline., 7 3 For strict constitutionalists like Justice Scalia, criticism of
utilizing international law also centers on the idea that such rights impose
positive obligations on the U.S. government, whereas the founding fathers
intended it to be limited and constrained.74 However, it is interesting to
note that federal courts have often relied on such authority to curtail, rather
than expand, such rights.75
67. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
52 (1981)).
68. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
69. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73.
70. Roger P. Alford, Symposium, Four Mistakes in the Debate on "Outsourcing
Authority, " 69 ALB. L. REv. 653, 674-75 (2006).
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598.
72. Id. (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari)). However, Scalia's critique overlooks the fact that much of U.S.
jurisprudence emerged from English law. In Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that:
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon
the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a
denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental
law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became
clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.
384 U.S. 436, 443 (1966) (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896)).
73. Alford, supra note 70, at 654.
74. Park, supra note 13, at 1203.
75. Alford, supra note 70, at 675-76 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-
06, 208 (2003) (discussing "international experiences to curtail the general freedom to
publish")); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 202-03, 211 (1992) (relying on "international
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In response to such criticism, individuals and courts can look to the
lengthy historical tradition of citing to foreign precedent, going back to
Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which a comparative assessment was used to
determine whether Scott was a citizen of Missouri. 76  "From the
beginning... American courts regularly took judicial notice of both
international law and foreign law" such that it would be a massive reversal
for U.S. constitutional interpretation to "now ignore international law
standards and the practices of other countries. 77  Consequently, taking
foreign precedent and international human rights law into account would
neither be unusual nor improper for other issues of constitutional
interpretation with regards to ESC rights. Although some scholars argue
that the U.S. Supreme Court has only recently relied upon foreign sources
with regard to important constitutional cases in which there has been a
historical dearth of precedent on the issues, 78 the references to, and
citations of, international law have been fairly prevalent over the past fifty
years.
Apart from citations to international law in recent Supreme Court
cases, there is a history of constitutional comparativism from the founding
days of America. Even prior to the New Deal era and the establishment of
social welfare policies, Thomas Jefferson, in the Declaration of
Independence, made reference to giving "decent respect to the opinions of
mankind. 79 While not explicitly granting ESC rights, this phrase in the
Declaration of Independence emphasizes the importance of looking beyond
our borders and interpreting U.S. laws and the Constitution within a
framework of the general advancement and perspectives of mankind.
These sources all provide language regarding the respect and value that
should be placed on international covenants and the legal progress in other
nations.
80
B. ESC RIGHTS AS A COMPONENT OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
There are two possible approaches to linking ESC rights with political
and civil rights, which form the basis of our constitutional rights as
currently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The first approach argues
that when ESC rights or sections thereof are adopted, these rights may be
practices to justify a restriction on core political speech around the voting booth");
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16, 735 (1997) (referencing "criminality of
physician-assisted suicide in western democracies to refrain from authorizing a
constitutional right to the procedure"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)
(citing international law to justify restrictions on obscene speech).
76. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 468, 484-85, 496-500 (1856).
77. Harold Hongju Koh, The United States Constitution and International Law:
International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45 (2004).
78. Alford, supra note 70, at 667.
79. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776); Alford, supra note 70,
at 664.
80. Alford, supra note 70, at 657-58.
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able to be expanded by arguing that the grant of such rights must comply
with political and civil rights. For example, Dutch legislation in which
"married women were denied certain unemployment benefits that were
granted to unmarried women and to all men, regardless of their being
married or not," was invalid because the legislation was based on the
presumption that married women were not the "breadwinners" of their
families. 8' Similar holdings have been made in the United States regarding
whether women in the military have to show additional proof that they are
the family breadwinner in order to get military benefits for their
husbands.82 However, this approach is dependent on portions of the ESC
rights being adopted.
The second approach to arguing that ESC rights should be recognized
by the United States is through asserting that these rights are implicitly
adopted by the Constitution because they are necessary to fully exercise the
political and civil rights provided for in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
ESC rights, such as education, are arguably necessary to successfully
utilize the political and civil rights explicitly granted, such as the right to
vote. Although this argument has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,83 as discussed
previously, the majority incorrectly framed the issue. The issue should not
have been whether there was a "guarantee to the citizenry [of] the most
effective speech or the more informed electoral choice, 84 but whether the
education provided met a minimum level necessary to sufficiently engage
in those political activities that are explicitly protected under the
Constitution.
Contrary to the Rodriguez opinion, education is often viewed as a
direct foundation for all other rights, including political and civil rights.85
Throughout American history, presidents and other political notables have
recognized the importance of an educated and informed citizenry. In one
of his fireside chats, President Roosevelt emphasized that "the only sure
bulwark of continuing liberty is a government strong enough to protect the
interests of the people, and a people strong enough and well enough
informed to maintain its sovereign control over its government."
86
81. Martin Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra note 1, at 29, 32.
82. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680, 691 (1973).
83. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
84. Id.
85. Nowak, supra note 11, at 245.
86. Robert L. Tsai, Democracy's Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (2006)
(quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Apr. 14, 1938)). See also Stanley
Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in
Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990) (discussing the court's recognition of
"the social value of an informed citizenry acting as sovereign overseeing governmental
action"); Brian C. Kalt, The People 's Forest and Levy 's Trees: Popular Sovereignty and the
Origins of the Bill of Rights, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 126 (2000) (explaining that
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Furthermore, a number of changes since the Rodriguez decision
support recognizing the right to education. Recent judicial opinions have
underscored the importance of education and its unique role and
significance in American society. For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the
Supreme Court emphasized:
[N]either is [education] merely some governmentai 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.
Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic
institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of
the child, mark the distinction. The American people have always
regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance .... In sum, education has a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society.87
Other decisions have mimicked this sentiment and noted that "laws
affecting education may be distinguished from other social legislation
because of education's 'importance ... in maintaining our basic
institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the
child.' ' 88 Finally, federal involvement in education is not unprecedented.
A current example is the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 .89
Additionally, the importance of education in fully exercising rights as
citizens can be analogized to women's suffrage. Allowing women to vote
was seen by some politicians as simply providing the husband with a
second vote, and, "in the nineteenth and early twentieth century [women]
were never seen as fully public, and public realm activities ... were
sometimes thought to impinge on their private identities and activities as
women." 90 Because a woman's place was seen as in the home, and they
lacked access to information and education available to men, anti-
suffragettes felt that women's votes would simply reflect their husband's
urges and not any independent political will. 91 Although an unpleasant
sentiment, it did in fact take "decades for women to be fully incorporated
into the electoral system and [they have] not exhibit[ed] an independent
voice in electoral politics until quite recently."92 Similarly, without a right
commentators also note that the U.S. Constitution provides not only rights, but also places
duties on the American public).
87. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
88. Brian B. v. Pa. Dep't. of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2000). See also
Cleland v. Nat'l. Coll. of Bus., 435 U.S. 213, 221 n.9 (1978) (recognizing the "undisputed
importance of education"); English v. Bd. of Educ., 301 F.3d 69, 80 (3d Cir. 2002)
("education is a governmental function of the utmost importance").
89. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
90. Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women's Citizenship Before and After the
Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW & HIST. REv. 479, 483 (2002).
91. Id. at 511.
92. Id. at 480.
to education, disadvantaged groups may be unable to exercise their
fundamental voting rights in an independent and informed manner. Thus,
the Supreme Court in Rodriguez improperly framed the question as
whether there is a constitutional right to a more informed vote versus an
informed vote, when the actual issue was whether there is a constitutional
right to gain access to information and education that will inform at the
most minimum level. Based on current precedents, the answer to this
second question must be yes.
C. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION OF
OTHER ESC RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
There are a number of challenges for establishing a constitutional
obligation to protect ESC rights. As discussed above, the Supreme Court
has arguably placed value on the right to education, but has yet to take the
final step of protecting the right to education. While education has not
been recognized as a fundamental right, arguments exist that other ESC
rights should be recognized as such. This line of reasoning - that the
government has failed to provide certain rights to citizens as a whole -
would likely be based on a fundamental right analysis. 93 There are three
general issues to consider when identifying fundamental rights: (1) "their
embodiment in positive law gives their enforcement a legitimating basis in
political consent;" (2) "their normative power does not derive solely from
their enactment as positive law;" and (3) "as legal rules they operate in an
institutional context., 94 While the third feature does not necessarily have to
be tied to the legitimization of such rights, it "may reflect practical
constraints on drafting and interpreting rights that already derive legitimacy
from suprapositive or consensual bases (or both)." 95 However, holding an
ESC right to be a fundamental right may be especially challenging since
case law has required that these rights be "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" in order to qualify for heightened scrutiny under the
doctrine of substantive due process.
96
There are two possible approaches for classifying other ESC rights as
fundamental. First, through an analysis similar to that used for education,
rights such as those to housing, food, and water are arguably essential to
fully exercising more established rights. This first approach is unlikely to
succeed. Initially, the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson moved
toward such a position by noting that residency requirements for welfare
affected "the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist -
93. Currently, the U.S. judiciary has yet to explicitly recognize those items covered
as ESC rights as fundamental rights, and have tightly limited use of the phrase "fundamental
rights." However, Section III of this Note addresses how the judiciary has already
recognized various aspects of these rights as protected under the U.S. Constitution.
94. Neuman, supra note 21, at 1866.
95. Id. at 1869.
96. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
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food, shelter, and other necessities of life. '97 Following this decision, some
courts believed that welfare could constitute a "fundamental" interest for
purposes of equal protection review. 98 However, this assessment was not
supported for any significant period of time.99  Although rejected by
subsequent decisions, the argument set forth in Shapiro is framed more
closely to that connected with education - as a necessary component to
fully exercising the established fundamental right to vote.
The second method to classify ESC rights as fundamental would be
through linking them to the penumbra of rights emerging from the
Fourteenth Amendment's explicit protection of life. 00  This second
approach differs from the initial thrust toward recognizing rights such as
the right to housing and food because it is not connected with an
established liberty interest, such as the right to vote.
The argument that the right to food and water is part of a penumbra of
rights covered under the "life" reference in the Fourteenth Amendment
more closely follows the modem substantive due process analysis. While
some rights such as privacy have been well established, new substantive
due process rights must meet a two-part test developed in Washington v.
Glucksberg.'0' The test requires: (1) a "careful description" of the asserted
liberty interest; and (2) consideration of whether the challenged activity is
objectively "deeply rooted" in the country's history and tradition.
0 2
Under this test, some ESC rights could qualify - the right to water, for
example, is supported by a history and tradition in the United States of
protecting water and the public's interest in water. As part of this tradition,
Section 101 of the Clean Water Act emphasizes the U.S. government's
current recognition of the importance of maintaining our water resources,'
03
and emerges as part of a tradition of protecting water.10 4 Similarly, a key
component of the public trust doctrine focuses on resource defense, and
emphasizes the government's duty to protect society's interest in public
resources.1
0 5
97. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
98. Id.
99. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 5th ed. 2005).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ) (emphasis added).
101. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703, 720-21 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
104. The tradition of protecting water resources began back in 1899 with the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2000), and is also evidenced in the Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000) (which has since become the
Clean Water Act), the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4601 (2000),
and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2000).
105. Michael A. Walker, CERCLA 'S Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A
Loophole for Private Landowners?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 425, 444-48 (1995).
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Apart from directly arguing that ESC rights should be recognized as
fundamental, a third approach asserts that ESC rights as a whole do not
significantly expand upon current U.S. jurisprudence. This argument may
have merit because various provisions of the Covenant on ESC Rights are
already recognized and protected under the U.S. Constitution. For
example, Article 7(a)(i) of the Covenant on ESC Rights emphasizes the
idea of equal pay for equal work. 10 6 This concept is also embodied in U.S.
statutory law through the Equal Pay Act, which states that no employer
shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying
differential wages to men and women. 10 7 Similarly, both the Covenant on
ESC Rights and federal law require that employees receive promotions
without discrimination. 10 8 There are parallels between the Covenant on
ESC Rights and U.S. jurisprudence regarding most of the major sub-topics,
including workers' rights, 10 9 social security,"0 children's rights,"' and
healthcare.' 12 This leaves only a few issues covered by the Covenant on
ESC Rights that are not currently considered legal rights in the United States. 1
3
D. ENFORCEMENT OF ESC RIGHTS AFTER THEIR RECOGNITION
Recognition of some or all of the ESC rights in the United States could
be problematic in terms of enforcement and implementation. One issue
that may arise is that of resource availability and distribution.' 14  In
106. Covenant on ESC Rights, Art. 7(a)(i), in LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note
16, at 7.
107. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
108. Compare International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), reprinted in LEGAL
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
109. In addition to those already discussed, the Covenant on ESC Rights, like U.S.
law, addresses the importance of safe and healthy working conditions (Article 7(b)) and the
fight to unionize and strike (Articles 8(l)(a) and (d)). International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966), reprinted in LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7-8.
110. Covenant on ESC Rights, Art. 9, in LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 8.
111. Covenant on ESC Rights, Art. 10(c), in LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 16,
at 8 (restricting child labor).
112. Covenant on ESC Rights, Art. 12, in LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 16, at
9. Although the U.S. does not have a universal healthcare plan, states and localities have
increased calls and taken steps to provide coverage to all uninsured. See Marc Lifsher,
Gov. 's Plans Stir Up Business Rift: Proposals on Issues Such as Healthcare Have
Executives at Odds, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007 (proposal by Governor Schwarzenegger for a
twelve billion dollar universal health insurance plan); Ken Dixon, Health Insurance-For-All
Backed in Hartford, CONN. POST ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2007; Jeffrey Young, Groups Unite on
Healthcare, THE HILL, Jan. 16, 2007.
113. The main point of difference is Article 1l(1) of the Covenant on ESC Rights,
which addresses fights to food, clothing and housing. These fights have not been
recognized in the U.S. and, in some cases, have been rejected. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no constitutional guarantee to housing).
114. Matthen Craven, Assessment of the Progress on Adjudication of Economic,
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addition, the United States may have a number of obligations to meet in
order to comply with the Covenant on ESC Rights, such as establishing
"appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, and other
measures" that would aid in realizing these rights. 15 However, due to the
technical requirements of passing federal legislation, this process would
undoubtedly be slow and lengthy, and could also include oversight of third
parties to ensure compliance.
For some issues, such as the regulation of third party compliance with
the Covenant's articles on employment, administrative structures already
exist that could easily handle regulation (and do so in connection with
those provisions that are already part of U.S. statutory law). With regards
to provisions imposing new and unique requirements, one option would be
enforcement through consent decrees, similar to the judicial supervision
provided during school desegregation. However, "[c]ourts are plainly
unsuited for [ongoing participation in the implementation process]. They
were never intended to serve in ongoing supervisory roles, and they
generally lack the resources, institutional support, and expertise to do
so.116 Although it may be inconvenient, the threat of judicial power may
be a necessary element to coerce states to comply with any new rules or
regulations. However, the current administrative regime appears best
suited to adopting new regulations and has structures already in place
through individual agencies. For example, in 1998, President Clinton
signed Executive Order 13107, which created a federal agency to educate
and address violations of the Covenant on ESC Rights." 17
IV. CONCLUSION
Protecting the right to education, employment, housing, and other ESC
rights would further equality in the United States, especially with regard to
groups that tend to suffer from a higher proportion of poverty and inherent
Social and Cultural Rights, in THE ROAD TO A REMEDY: CURRENT ISSUES IN THE LITIGATION
OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 27, 27 (John Squires, Malcolm Langford &
Bret Thiele eds., 2005).
115. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 553, 555 (Dr. Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed., 2005) [hereinafter Maastricht
Guidelines].
116. Stark, supra note 4, at 118.
117. Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eol3107.htm. This executive order seeks to implement and
promote "the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and
other relevant treaties concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights to
which the United States is now or may become a party in the future .... Exec. Order No.
13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
eo13107.htm.
bias in the legal system. However, the stigma associated with ESC rights
must be addressed. ESC rights, such as the right to education and the right
to work, have traditionally been viewed as associated with the socialist
state.118 During the Cold War, the United States viewed the Covenant as a
"socialist manifesto thinly veiled in the language of rights."'1 19 Although
the United States is no longer in the McCarthy era, the sense of America
moving in a socialist direction would challenge the American public's
perception of government. However, the interpretation of the Covenant on
ESC Rights as a foreign socialist entity is not supported by either its text or
the social climate of the United States. Rather, a number of the
subcategories identified articulate rights that exist and have been accepted
and established in the United States. For example, as part of the Covenant
on ESC Rights' articulation of the "right to work," Articles 7 and 8 set
forth sub-rights such as equal pay for equal work between men and women,
safe and healthy working conditions, equal opportunity to be promoted, and
the right to unionize.120  Although the trend has been to rely on market
forces to address and resolve social welfare issues, "as a matter of
international law, the State remains ultimately responsible for guaranteeing
the realization of these rights.'
12 1
Finally, the structure of the federal government encourages
experimentation at the state level, which could help to develop the most
effective means of implementing ESC rights. States have been making
additional progress on some rights, such as housing and education, even
without formal federal recognition of ESC rights. 22 In part, this is due to
the fact that there are "core structural and substantive similarities between
the Covenant and state constitutions," and "[e]conomic rights have always
been at the heart of ... state jurisprudence."' 
23
Even though states appear to be moving in a positive direction toward
protecting ESC rights, statements by the current administration and new
additions to the Supreme Court foreshadow future trends of citing and
accepting international law. Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez
criticized the use of constitutional comparatives as undermining the Court's
118. Nowak, supra note 11, at 248.
119. Stark, supra note 4, at 81.
120. Eide, supra note 1, at 7-8. The actual phrase "equal pay for equal work" is a
standard that has been adopted and integrated into modem U.S. jurisprudence with regards
to workplace discrimination against women. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similar issues arise with the other rights
articulated in the Covenant for ESC Rights. Another such example emerges in Article 12,
which articulates access to medical care. Eide, supra note 1, at 9. While there is not
universal health care in the United States, politicians and interest groups have begun calling
for healthcare and taking steps toward providing full coverage. See Lifsher, supra note 112;
Dixon, supra note 112; Young, supra note 112.
121. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 115, at 554.
122. Park, supra note 13, at 1255-61.
123. Stark, supra note 4, at 91-92.
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legitimacy, and both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito testified during
their confirmation hearings that they have "deep skepticism" about the use
of foreign authority in constitutional interpretation.1
24
As this Note has demonstrated, the distinction between political and
civil rights and ESC rights is not clear-cut. Current federal legislation has
already taken steps toward protecting ESC rights, such as education and
employment, and the equal protection framework in place provides a basis
for reviewing any claims that might arise due to violations of ESC rights.
The only step remaining is formal recognition that ESC rights need to be
protected.
124. Alford, supra note 70, at 661-62.
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